We examine theoretical predictions and econometric evidence concerning franchise contracting and sales-force compensation and suggest a number of factors that ought to influence the contracts that are written between principals and agents. For each factor, we construct the simplest theoretical model that is capable of capturing what we feel to be its essence. The comparative statics from the theoretical exercise are then used to organize our discussion of the empirical evidence, where the evidence is taken from published studies that have attempted to assess each factor's effect on the power of agent incentives. We also discuss theoretical issues and empirical results pertaining to a few topics that have been addressed in the literature but that do not fit easily into our simple modeling framework. 2
I: Introduction
The modern theory of the internal organization of firms --the ownership, management, and structure of production --has its roots in the writings of Knight [1921] and Coase [1937] . Knight emphasized the role of risk and uncertainty and the need to insure workers and consolidate managerial-decision making, whereas Coase focused on the costs of transacting in different organizational environments, particularly the costs of writing contracts. Over time, these notions have been expanded and formalized. Moreover, in the process, two distinct but related branches of literature have emerged. The first concentrates on the tradeoff that a principal must make between providing an agent with insurance against risk and giving that agent incentives to work efficiently (e.g., Williamson [1971] , Alchian and Demsetz [1972] , and Holmstrom [1982] ), whereas the second emphasizes the market failures that accompany relationship-specific assets and the associated need to assign property and residual-decision rights correctly (e.g., Klein, Crawford, and Alchian [1978] , Williamson [1979 Williamson [ , 1983 , Grossman and Hart [1986] , and Hart and Moore [1990] ).
On the empirical side, efforts to test these theories have been channeled into areas that satisfy two criteria. First, the institutional regularities must correspond to the assumptions that underlie the theories, and second, sufficient data must be available. Three areas that satisfy these constraints have received a large fraction of the attention of applied contract theorists: executive compensation, sales-force and franchise contracting, and industrial procurement.
Executive-compensation packages provide a rich laboratory in which to test the insurance/incentive aspects of contract theory. 1 Incentive pay is a nontrivial fraction of topmanagement compensation, where it takes the form of, for example, performance-based bonuses, stock ownership, and options to purchase shares in the firm. Furthermore, the details of executivecompensation packages are often publicly available.
Incentive pay is less prevalent, however, for low-level managers and production workers inside the firm. Nevertheless, it surfaces at this level of the hierarchy in at least one area where it takes a somewhat different form. 2 Franchise contracting is an increasingly popular method of organization for retail markets. Rather than employ an agent to sell a product and give that agent high-powered incentives within the firm, companies often choose a less integrated form of organization that allows them to share their risks and profits with their local managers or agents in a flexible way. In particular, principals can control the incentive/insurance tradeoff by proper choice 1 See, for example, Murphy [1984] , Jensen and Murphy [1990] , Kaplan [1994] , and Garen [1996] . 2 For other areas, see e.g. Lazear [1996] on the effect of piece rates on production-worker productivity. For a broader discussion of the effect of human-resource-management practices on production-worker productivity, see e.g. Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi, [1997] .
of franchise-contract terms. The principal's problem is thus whether to use internal or external salespeople and, in the latter case, how to structure the external contract.
Finally, the theory of relationship-specific investment and the associated need to assign property rights has been extensively tested in the area of input procurement. 3 When firms require specialized inputs that have higher value inside the buyer/seller relationship than in a more general market, they must decide if they will produce those inputs themselves or purchase them from an independent supplier. In the latter case, they must also decide whether to interact in a spot market or enter into a long-term contract. Moreover, the tradeoff between productive efficiency and the severity of the holdup problem can be dealt with through the choice of the terms of the procurement contract, specifically its length and flexibility.
In this paper, we look at the second of the above areas of empirical research, franchise contracting and sales-force compensation, and we examine different aspects of the incentive/insurance tradeoff in that context. 4 We do this in two ways. First, we construct the simplest theoretical model that is capable of capturing the effect of our focus, and second, we examine the empirical evidence from published studies that have assessed this aspect of the problem.
The models that we construct are based on the standard principal/agent paradigm. We make no effort to be theoretically sophisticated. Instead, we choose convenient functional forms that lead to definite solutions to the contracting problem. Furthermore, we construct models that involve only a few parameters, and we examine the models' comparative statics with respect to those parameters.
Finally, we use the comparative statics from the theoretical exercise to organize our discussion of the empirical evidence.
The object of our exercise is to determine how well the simple theories perform in predicting the empirical regularities. It turns out that the empirical evidence is surprisingly consistent. In other words, coefficients from different studies that focus on a particular aspect of the contracting problem are usually of the same sign. This means that there is a set of stylized facts that should be explained. Unfortunately, the agreement between theoretical predictions and empirical regularities is less satisfactory than the robustness of the empirical findings. For this reason, when we discover that theory and evidence do not agree, we attempt to modify the simple model by introducing neglected aspects of the problem that move the theory in the direction of the data. 3 For example, see Monteverde and Teece [1982] , Masten [1984] , Masten and Crocker [1985] , Joskow [1988] , Klein [1988] , and Crocker and Reynolds [1992] . For surveys of this empirical literature, see Klein and Shelanski [1995] and Crocker and Masten [1996] . 4 For surveys of the franchising literature with a different emphasis, see Dnes [1996] and Elango and Fried [1997] . For a survey with a broader contracting focus, see Lyons [1996] .
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we develop some background material on the environment in which franchising operates and the constraints that franchising data impose on the analysis.
In section III, which is the heart of the paper, we decompose the contract-choice problem into components that are amenable to econometric investigation. We make use of a standard agency model to organize our discussion of nine aspects of the contracting problem and how each affects the choice of organizational form. These aspects are local-market risk, the importance of the agent's effort, the size of the outlet, the difficulty of monitoring the agent, the importance of the principal's effort, the nature of product substitutability, spillovers among units of the chain, strategic delegation of the pricing decision, and the division of the agent's effort among tasks. We model each of these factors with a different specification of the effort/sales relationship in an otherwise standard model, and then examine the relevant evidence. We conclude this section with a short overview of studies that assess the effects of these same factors but have focused on contract terms rather than contract choice.
In section IV, we turn briefly to some loose ends that need tying. In particular, we touch upon the consequences of contract choice for the level of product prices, its effect on firm performance, the lack of contract fine tuning in most real-world markets, why royalties are based on sales rather than profits, and the relevance of asset specificity for retail-contract choice.
Finally, section V summarizes and concludes.
II: Background
Manufacturers of retail products must decide whether to sell their products to consumers themselves (vertical integration) or to sell via independent retailers (vertical separation). When manufacturers do not perform the sales function internally, but want exclusive retailers, they either choose some form of franchising or employ an independent sales force.
Within the realm of franchising, there are two commonly used modes. Traditional franchising, which involves an upstream producer and a downstream seller (e.g., gasoline), accounts for the larger fraction of sales revenues. Business-format franchising, however, is the faster growing of the two. With business-format franchising, the franchisor provides a trademark, a marketing strategy, and quality control to the franchisee in exchange for royalty payments and upfront fees. Production, however, usually takes place at the retail outlet (e.g., fast-food). 5
5
The distinction between these two types of franchising can be blurred sometimes because business-format franchisors can sell inputs to franchisees (e.g. Baskin-Robbins), and traditional franchisors offer training and ongoing business support to their dealers as well. See Dnes [1992 Dnes [ , 1993 for more on this.
Not all selling agents that are separated from the parent firm are franchisees. Some industrial companies choose between an internal sales force, which is known as "direct" sales, and an external sales representative. A manufacturer's external sales representative is an independent business entity that offers selling services and receives commissions on realized sales. This agency often serves a number of noncompeting manufacturers whose products form a package or product line. Moreover, the agency is normally each principals' exclusive representative for a designated set of customers.
Both the use of franchising and independent sales forces normally involve profit and risk sharing. As a consequence, much of the agency-theoretic literature in the retail-contracting area focuses on explaining the size of the share parameter in a franchise or sales contract, where the share parameter determines the partition of residual-claimancy rights between principal and agent.
In particular, the literature shows how this parameter should vary as various aspects of the problem change. 6 In real-world markets, in contrast, instead of offering contracts tailored to the characteristics of each unit, location, and agent, most firms employ a limited set of contracts, often just two --a franchise and an integrated contract. In doing this, they reduce the problem of choosing the contract terms for any particular unit from a continuum of options to a simpler dichotomous choice. 7 Consequently, much of the empirical literature has analyzed the dichotomous choice between company operation (vertical integration, which is associated with lower-powered incentives) and franchising (vertical separation, which is associated with higher-powered incentives) using arguments that were developed to explain how firms should choose the terms of their contracts. In what follows, we focus mostly on the findings from the literature that examines this dichotomy.
However, we discuss the more limited literature on the determinants of the terms of franchise contracts at the end of Section 3. We also return later, in Section 4, to the reasons why firms employ a set of standard contracts.
6
See for example Rubin [1978] , Mathewson and Winter [1985] , Lal [1990] , and Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine [1995] . Also see Stiglitz [1974] for the earliest application of agency theory to explain the use and properties of a type of share contract, namely sharecropping.
7
In business-format franchising, different franchisors choose different contract terms --different royalty rates and franchise fees --but a given franchisor offers the same terms to all potential franchisees at a given point in time. This makes the franchise versus company-operation dichotomy a meaningful one; if contracts were allowed to vary for each franchisee, then, assuming for simplicity that the company manager is paid a fixed salary, company ownership would be a limit case where the royalty rate is zero and the franchise fee negative. Of course, such a limit case would hardly ever be observed. In reality, the dichotomy involves more than just differences in the compensation scheme of the unit manager; it also involves differences in asset ownership and in the distribution of responsibilities between upstream and downstream parties. Similarly, in traditional franchising, while commission rates and fees can vary across a firm's agents, the distinction between integration and separation is well defined. This distinction again involves differences in the distribution of power between manufacturer and retailer (see, for example, Smith II [1982] and Slade [1998a] ).
Our analysis of the empirical evidence concerning retail contracting makes use of two sorts of studies. Data for the first sort are at the level of the upstream firm (or sector) and describe the extent to which managers choose to integrate vertically (i.e., their proportion of company-owned units). These data are typically cross sections of either a large number of firms from a broad range of industries or a number of narrowly defined retail sectors. 8 Data for the second type are either at the level of the downstream unit or the sales force in a district and refer to whether this unit is integrated with the upstream firm. These data are typically cross sections from a few upstream firms in a single industry. 9 In other words, with the first type of study, an observation is an upstream firm, whereas with the second, it is a contract. The two sets of studies also differ in that the first involves only business-format franchising, whereas the second includes some traditionalfranchising industries in which the principal is a manufacturer. Tables 1 to 6 summarize the findings of studies that assess the choice between integration and separation. In all these tables, the signs in the final columns show the observed effect of a variable of interest on the tendency towards vertical separation. A minus sign thus indicates a negative correlation with the extent of franchising in a chain or with the use of "separated" sales representatives in the sales-force-integration problem. Moreover, an asterisk next to a plus or minus sign indicates that the finding is statistically significant at the 0.05 level based on a two-tailed
test.
In what follows, each portion of the table is discussed in the subsection that presents the corresponding theory. One should be aware that the authors of the empirical studies do not always interpret their results in the way that we do. However, since we try to organize the empirical evidence using the framework of our model, we make no attempt to reconcile their interpretations and ours.
III: Factors that Influence Contract Choice

IIIa: The Basic Model
We have identified nine factors that frequently surface in empirical investigations of the determinants of retail contracting. These factors are not necessarily the most important, since our list is constrained by considerations of measurability and data availability. To illustrate, the agent's degree of risk aversion plays an important role in the theoretical incentive-contracting literature.
8
For example, Brickley and Dark [1987] , John and Weitz [1988] , Martin [1988] , Norton [1988] , Lafontaine [1992a] , and Scott [1995] . 9 For example, Anderson and Schmittlein [1984] , Barron and Umbeck [1984] , Anderson [1985] , Brickley and Dark [1987] , Minkler [1990] , Muris, Scheffman and Spiller [1992] , Shepard [1993] , Graddy [1995] , Lafontaine [1995] , and Slade [1996 and .
Unfortunately, from an empirical point of view, it is virtually impossible to measure this factor. For this reason, we do not include it on our list.
In performing our analysis of the factors, we use the following standard principal/agent model. An agent exerts an effort, a, that results in an outcome, q, according to the relationship
In equation (1), ε is a random variable that determines risk, and Θ is a vector of parameters. We identify the outcome, q, with sales, which is indistinguishable from sales revenue since we normalize product price to one. The functional form of f(.) will vary, depending on the aspect of the incentivecontracting problem that we examine. Indeed, it is our principal method of distinguishing the various factors whose effects we analyze below.
The agent bears a private cost of effort, C(a) = a 2 /2, and receives utility from his income y, 10 In other words, αq is the agent's incentive pay, whereas W is his insured income. One can write the contract in an alternate but equivalent form that corresponds more closely to a business-format franchise contract. In particular, as we have not restricted the signs of α and W, it is possible to express the agent's payment as s(q) = (1 -ρ)q -F, where F is the franchise fee, and ρ is the royalty rate. As we want our model to describe both types of franchising as well as industrial selling, in what follows, we choose to use the former notation. The agent's income is then y = αq + W -a 2 /2.
The parameter, α, plays a key role in the analysis as it determines the agent's share of residual claims. Two limit cases are of interest. When α = 0, the agent is a salaried employee who is perfectly insured, whereas when α = 1, the agent is the residual claimant who bears all of the risk. One expects that, in general, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. We identify α with the power of the agent's incentives.
Moreover, we assume that inside the firm these incentives are low, whereas the contracts that are written with non-employees are higher powered. In theory, this need not be the case. 11 In practice, however, it is a strong empirical regularity. 12
10
We use the word linear here as has traditionally been done in the share-contract literature. The contracts, however, typically include a fixed component and are thus affine.
11
See e.g. Lutz [1995] for a discussion of this issue in the context of franchising.
12
For a possible explanation, see Holmstrom and Milgrom [1994] We also restrict attention to linear contracts. Clearly, linearity is associated with mathematical tractability, which is desirable from our point of view. Unfortunately, however, optimal contracts are rarely linear. Nevertheless, linearity is the rule, not the exception, when one examines the contracts that are written in real-world situations. 13 We do not attempt to explain these two observed phenomena --low-powered incentives inside firms and linear contracts. Instead, we take them as empirical regularities that can be used to simplify the model.
We now turn to the factors of interest, the first of which is risk.
IIIb: Risk
One can use the simplest possible form of the effort/sales relationship to capture the effect that risk has on the form of the agent's contract. Specifically, let
The random variable, ε, is a proxy for either demand or supply uncertainty. In other words, one can interpret (2) as a demand equation (with price suppressed) where the role of effort is to increase sales. On the other hand, one can view (2) as an effort/output production function. 14 With this form of the effort/sales function, the agent's certainty-equivalent income is given
where the last term, -r/2 Var(y), is the agent's risk premium. Given a contract (α,W), the agent will choose effort to maximize equation (3), which leads to the first-order condition
The principal is assumed to maximize the total surplus, which she can extract from the agent with the fixed payment, W. Alternatively, W can be used to divide the surplus between principal and
13
For possible explanations, see Holmstrom and Milgrom [1987] , Romano [1994] , and Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine [1995] . 14 In franchising applications, see Lal [1990] for an example of the first type of interpretation, and Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine [1995] for an example of the second. agent when some rent is left downstream. 15 We do not model the choice of W, which we leave intentionally vague. The principal's problem is then to
α,a subject to the agent's incentive constraint (4) and a participation constraint that we also do not model. 16 When equation (4) is substituted into the first-order condition for the maximization of (5) with respect to α, one finds that, in the optimal contract,
Equation (6) implies that when either risk or the agent's degree of risk aversion increases, α falls.
The standard agency model of retail contracting therefore suggests that, as the level of uncertainty increases, so does the need for agent insurance and thus the desirability of vertical integration. In other words, the firm will choose to integrate its retail activities more when facing more uncertainty because the lower-powered incentives used inside the firm protect the agent from the vagaries of the market, a protection that becomes all the more valuable as the level of uncertainty rises.
The notion of uncertainty or risk that is relevant in this context is the risk that is borne by the agent, not by the manufacturer. In other words, it is risk at the outlet or downstream level.
Unfortunately, data that measure outlet risk are virtually nonexistent. For this reason, imperfect proxies are employed. The two most common are some measure of variation in detrended sales per outlet, and some measure of the fraction of outlets that were discontinued in a particular period of time. 17 Furthermore, data are more often available at the level of the sector rather than at the level of the franchisor or upstream firm. Table 1 gives details of five studies that assess the role of risk in determining the tendency towards franchising (i.e., vertical separation). In all but one of these studies, contrary to prediction, increased risk leads to more franchising (increased separation). Moreover, this positive association 15 See Kaufmann and Lafontaine [1994] for evidence that there are rents left downstream at McDonald's. The authors argue that they serve an incentive role similar to that of efficiency wages. Michael and Moore [1995] find evidence that such rents are present in other franchised systems as well.
16
The participation constraint is normally used to determine W, not α.
17
On the relative merits of these two measures, see Lafontaine and Bhattacharyya [1995] .
does not depend on the measure of risk that is used. These results suggest a robust pattern that is unsupportive of the standard agency model.
The finding that risk is positively associated with vertical separation is indeed a puzzle.
Moreover, allowing effort to interact with risk in our model only makes matters worse. In particular, if equation (2) is replaced with q = a ε, higher powered incentives become even more costly, since, by increasing the agent's effort, they also increase the risk that he must bear. Similarly, allowing the agent to have private information about the realization of ε does not help matters. In such a model, increased uncertainty is associated with greater informational rent, which magnifies the tendency towards integration (Gal-Or [1995] ). 18 Some authors have concluded from this that franchisors shed risk onto franchisees (e.g. Martin [1988] ). This would be optimal, however, only if franchisors were more risk averse than franchisees. However, if franchisors were indeed more risk averse, there would be less need to balance franchisee incentive and insurance needs, and hence less need to use a share contract. At the extreme, franchising would involve franchisees paying only lump-sum fees to franchisors, a situation that is rarely observed in practice.
An alternative, and we believe more satisfactory, explanation for the observed risk/franchising phenomenon surfaces when one considers that market uncertainty can be 18 This result depends on the assumption that information flows are superior within the firm.
endogenous and that the power of incentives can influence sales variability. Indeed, franchisees often have superior information concerning local-market conditions (separate from ε). Moreover, since franchising gives retailers greater incentives to react to these conditions, one is likely to find more sales variability in franchised than in company-owned units. 19 In that sense, we believe that the positive relationship between risk and franchising can be understood as support for incentivebased arguments for franchising.
IIIc: Agent Effort
Not all agents are equally important in determining the success or failure of a retail outlet.
For example, consider the case of gasoline retailing. Some station operators are merely cashiers who sit in kiosks and collect payment from customers. Others, in contrast, offer a range of services that can include pumping gas, washing windows, checking oil, selling tires, batteries, and other automobile-related items, and repairing cars. Still others manage affiliated convenience stores.
To capture the notion that there are varying degrees of agent importance, we amend the effort/sales function as follows,
while keeping the rest of the model intact. In equation (7), the parameter η, which is positive by assumption, is a proxy for the importance of the agent's effort.
After performing the same set of calculations as in the previous subsection, one finds that, with the new effort/sales function,
Moreover, differentiation of (8) with respect to η shows that dα*/dη > 0.
The theory thus predicts that increases in the importance of the retailer's input should be associated with more separation and higher-powered contracts. In other words, when the agent's job is more entrepreneurial in nature, his payment should reflect this fact.
From a practical point of view, the measures that have been used to capture this effect have been determined both by data availability and by the industry being studied. Proxies for the importance of the agent's effort (or its inverse) have included measures of labor intensity (either 19 See e.g. Lafontaine and Bhattacharyya, [1995] . Note that the positive relationship between incentives and output variability that they find depends on the form of the function that maps effort and the random variables into output.
employees/sales or capital/labor ratios) as the agent is the one who must oversee the provision of labor. Researchers have also used a measure of the agent's value added, or discretion over input choices, and a variable that captures whether previous experience in the business is required.
Finally, two studies of gasoline retailing rely on a dummy variable that distinguishes full from self service. Table 2 summarizes the results from seven studies that assess agent importance. In every case where the coefficient of the agent-importance variable is statistically significant, its relationship with separation from the parent company is positive, as predicted by standard agency considerations and other incentive-based arguments. In other words, when the agent's effort plays a more significant role in determining sales, franchising is more likely. 
IIId: Outlet Size
Modeling the effect of outlet size is less straightforward than the previous two factors, and model predictions are more sensitive to specification as a consequence. We confess that the particular specification that we adopt was chosen so that results are consistent with the empirical regularity that we present below. Indeed, it is necessary that we model size as interacting with risk in order to obtain our prediction. 20 With this caveat, we specify the effort/sales relationship as a production function whose arguments are effort or labor, a, and outlet size or capital, k,
All other assumptions are as before. There are two things to note about equation (9). The parameter γ measures the importance of capital in the production function, whereas k is a proxy for the amount of capital invested.
Furthermore, our specification assumes that a larger outlet is associated with increased agent risk.
This does not mean that the market is riskier per se; it simply means that more capital is subject to the same degree of risk.
After the standard set of manipulations, we obtain
(10)
Note that γ does not affect the optimal choice of contract, but k does. In other words, the amount of capital invested in the outlet rather than its importance in determining sales is what matters. Furthermore, differentiating α* with respect to k yields a negative relationship, which implies that the agent should be given lower-powered incentives when the size of the capital outlay increases. This presumes that it is the agent's capital, not the principal's, that is at risk. In other words, the larger the outlet, the more capital the franchisee has at stake and the more insurance he requires. Thus the solution implies a lower share for the agent, or more vertical integration.
Furthermore, vertical integration in this context has the added advantage that it substitutes the principal's capital for the agent's. 21 Unlike the factors discussed above, the empirical measurement of size is fairly straightforward. Common measures are average sales per outlet and the initial investment required. Table 3 shows that, with one exception, greater size leads to less separation or increased company 20 For example, if one assumes that k in (9) enters additively, then changes in k have no effect on the optimal share parameter, α. If one assumes that k multiplies a, then its effect is the same as that of η in the previous subsection, and increases in k lead to higher values of α, the reverse of what we obtain with our formulation.
21
See Brickley and Dark [1987] for more on this argument, which they refer to as the "inefficient riskbearing" argument against franchising.
ownership. In other words, as the model predicts, people responsible for large outlets tend to be company employees who receive low-powered incentives. 22 It is comforting to see that theory and evidence agree. Nevertheless, as noted above, it is possible to argue for the opposite relationship in an equally convincing manner. Indeed, when an outlet is large, the agent has more responsibility. For this reason, outlet size has been used in the empirical literature as a measure of the importance of the agent's input. Not surprisingly then, it is often claimed that an agency model should predict that an increase in size will be associated with 22 Consistent with the above evidence, Muris, Scheffman and Spiller [1992] also argue that the increase in the efficient size of bottling operations led soft-drink manufacturers to buy back several of their independent bottlers and enter into joint-venture agreements with many others. more separation and higher-powered incentives. Furthermore in a model with spillovers across units of the same chain, smaller outlets have a greater tendency to free ride since outlets with larger market shares can internalize more of the externality (Gal-Or [1995] ). In this type of model, small units would be more likely to be vertically integrated. 23 The data, however, contradict this prediction.
IIIe: Costly Monitoring 24
The idea that monitoring the agent's effort can be costly or difficult for the principal is central to the incentive-based-contracting literature. In fact, if monitoring were costless and effort contractible, there would be no need for incentive pay. The agent's effort level would be known to the principal with certainty, and a contract of the following form could be offered: If the agent worked at least as hard as the first-best-effort level, 25 he would receive a salary that compensated him for his effort, whereas if his effort fell short of this level, he would receive nothing. In equilibrium, the agent would be fully insured, and the first-best outcome would be achieved.
Given the centrality of the notion of costly monitoring, it is somewhat surprising that there exists confusion in the literature concerning the effect of an increase in monitoring cost on the tendency towards company operation. For example, consider the following statements from the empirical literature:
The likelihood of integration should increase with the difficulty of monitoring performance. (Anderson and Schmittlein [1984 p. 388 
]).
Franchised units (as opposed to vertical integration) will be observed where the cost of monitoring is high. (Brickley and Dark [1987 p. 408 ], text in parentheses added).
These contradictory statements imply that monitoring difficulties should both encourage and discourage vertical integration.
To reconcile these discrepancies, we modify the standard agency model to include the possibility that the principal can use not only outcome (i.e., sales) information to infer something 23
This result also depends on the assumption that information flows are superior within the firm.
24
This subsection is based on Lafontaine and Slade [1996] .
25
The first-best-effort level is defined as the level that the principal would choose if she were not constrained by incentive considerations in maximizing the total surplus. about the agent's effort, but also a direct signal of effort. 26 Furthermore, the principal is allowed to base the agent's compensation on both signals. 27 We consider two types of signals because, in most real-world manufacturer-retailer relationships, it is possible to supervise the actions of a retailer directly by, for example, testing food quality, assessing the cleanliness of the unit, and determining work hours. This direct supervision provides the manufacturer with information on retailer effort that supplements the information contained in sales data. In general, the informativeness principle (Holmstrom [1979] Milgrom and Roberts [1992, p. 219] ) suggests that compensation should be based on both sales data and signals of effort obtained via direct monitoring.
To model this situation, we replace the effort/sales relationship (1) with two functions to denote the fact that the principal receives two noisy signals of the agent's effort. 28 First, the principal observes retail sales of the product, q, and second, the principal receives a direct signal of effort, e,
e = a + ε 2 ,
The contract that the principal offers the agent is amended to include, in addition to the fixed wage W, not only an outcome-based or sales commission rate, α 1 , but also a behavior-based commission rate, α 2 , that relates to the direct signal of effort. The agent's certainty-equivalent income is then (α 1 + α 2 ) a + W -a 2 /2 -(r/2) α T Σα, where α is the vector of commissions, α = (α 1 ,α 2 ) T . The agent's incentive constraint for this problem is a = α 1 + α 2.
As before, the risk-neutral principal chooses the agent's effort and the commission vector to maximize the total surplus subject to the agent's incentive constraint. When the two first-order conditions for this problem are solved they yield
26
One alternative source of information that we do not consider arises when uncertainty is correlated across agents in a multi-agent setting. In that case, the optimal contract for agent i includes some measure of other agents' performance in addition to his own, as in Holmstrom [1982] . Empirically, such relative-performance contracts are not used in franchising. 27 The type of mechanism that we have in mind is sometimes called "behavior-based" compensation, as opposed to "outcome-based" compensation. See Anderson and Oliver [1987] . 28 The model is similar to Holmstrom and Milgrom [1991] , who model multiple tasks and signals.
When the noisy signals are uncorrelated, so that σ ij = 0, equation (12) takes the simpler form
which shows that the optimal contract described in equation (6) must now be modified to account for the relative precisions of the two signals. In other words, the compensation package places relatively more weight on the signal with the smaller variance. Equation (6) is a special case of (13) in which σ 22 is infinite (direct monitoring contains no information).
We are interested in the effect of increases in the two sorts of uncertainty on the size of α * 1 , since this is the incentive-based pay that appears in the data. Differentiation of equation (12) with respect to the two variances shows that dα * 1 /dσ 11 < 0 and dα * 1 /dσ 22 > 0. Increases in the precision of sales data (1/σ 11 ) thus lead to a higher reliance on outcome-based compensation (higher α 1 ), which corresponds to less vertical integration. However, increases in the precision of the direct signal of effort (1/σ 22 ) lead to less outcome-based compensation (lower α 1 ) or more vertical integration. While the above model does not explicitly include monitoring costs, it should be clear that if the upstream firm can choose some action that reduces σ 11 (increases the precision of sales as a signal of effort) at some cost, it will do so to a greater extent the lower this cost is. The resulting decrease in σ 11 will in turn lead to a greater reliance on sales data in the compensation scheme. In other words, when the cost of increasing the precision of sales data as an indicator of effort is low, we should observe more reliance on sales data in the compensation scheme, which means less vertical integration. On the other hand, when the cost of behavior monitoring, or of reducing σ 22 , is low, the firm will perform more of this type of monitoring. A low σ 22 will then lead the firm to choose a lower α 1 , which amounts to more vertical integration. 29 To summarize, our comparative statics show that the effect of monitoring on the degree of vertical integration depends on the type of information garnered by the firm in the process. If this information gives a better direct signal of effort, it reduces the need to use sales-based incentive contracting. If, on the other hand, monitoring increases the value of sales data by increasing its precision, it makes incentive contracting more attractive.
29
In mapping our results from more or less sales-based compensation to more or less vertical integration, we are implicitly assuming that behavior monitoring takes place, and behavior-based compensation is used, inside the firm, but that sales commissions are not or are little used inside the firm. With complete separation, in contrast, the agent is the residual claimant, and there is no (or very little) behavior monitoring or behavior-based compensation. See Holmstrom and Milgrom [1991] for a discussion of these issues. See Bradach [1997] for descriptions of business practices in five franchised restaurant chains that suggest that these assumptions are realistic.
Turning to the empirical evidence, the first part of table 4 shows results obtained in the sales-force compensation literature, where the focus has been on the usefulness of observed sales data in assessing agent effort. In the first two studies, researchers asked managers to respond to various statements: In Anderson and Schmittlein [1984] , they responded to "it is very difficult to measure equitably the results of individual salespeople" while in Anderson [1985] , the measure was tabulated from responses to "(1) team sales are common, (2) sales and cost records tend to be inaccurate at the individual level, and (3) mere sales volumes and cost figures are not enough to make a fair evaluation." In John and Weitz [1988] , the length of the selling cycle was used on the basis that a long lag between actions and market responses makes it difficult to attribute output to effort. In addition, these authors included a measure of environmental uncertainty, which captures the extent to which agents "control" sales outcomes. Using scores thus obtained as measures of the cost of monitoring sales and inferring effort from it, researchers found that higher monitoring costs lead to more vertical integration, as predicted by our model. whether the unit is more likely to be in a mostly urban or rural area) or of distance from monitoring headquarters. These measures are proxies for the cost of sending a company representative to visit the unit to obtain data on cleanliness, product quality, etc. Outlet density has also been used, but 
IIIf: Franchisor Effort
The standard agency model assumes, as we have, that only one party, the agent, provides effort in the production (or sales-generation) process. In reality, success at the retail level often depends importantly on the behavior of the upstream firm or principal. For example, franchisees expect their franchisors to exert effort towards maintaining the value of the tradename under which they operate, via advertising and promotions, as well as screening and policing other franchisees in the chain. If this behavior is not easily assessed by the franchisee, there is moral hazard on both sides --the franchisee's and the franchisor's --and the franchisor, like the franchisee, must be given incentives to perform. 30 To capture the effect of franchisor effort on the optimal contract, we amend the effort/sales relationship to include not only franchisee effort, a, but also franchisor effort, b,
where the parameter θ > 0 is a proxy for the importance of the franchisor's effort. Assume also that the private cost of effort for the franchisor is C(b) = b 2 /2, the same as for the franchisee. The franchisor still chooses the share parameter, α, in the first stage, but now the contract must satisfy incentive compatibility for both parties. As before, the first-order condition for the franchisee's effort gives a =α η. The first-order condition for the franchisor's effort is b = (1-α)θ. Substituting these into the total-surplus function, one obtains the optimal-share parameter
30 See e.g. Rubin [1978] , Mathewson and Winter [1985] , Lal [1990] and Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine [1995] for more on this. Consistent with the argument that the franchisor must be given incentives in these cases, in the one case of a franchise agreement that does not involve any ongoing royalties or company ownership on the part of the franchisor, Dnes [1993] notes that "Franchisees (in this system) do complain of insufficient effort by the franchisor in supporting the development of their businesses." (p. 386; text in parentheses added) Differentiating α* with respect to η again shows that the optimal share, or the extent of vertical separation, goes up as the franchisee's input becomes more important. However, differentiating α* with respect to θ yields the opposite effect; not surprisingly, when the input of the franchisor increases in importance, it is the share of output that she receives, (1-α*) , or the extent of vertical integration, that must rise. Table 5 shows results obtained in five studies that have considered how the importance of the franchisor's input affects the optimal contract choice. The importance of these inputs is measured by the value of the tradename (proxied by the number of outlets in the chain or the difference between the market and the book value of equity), the amount of training or advertising provided by the franchisor, or the number of years spent developing the business format prior to franchising. The table shows that, in all cases, when franchisor inputs are more important, less vertical separation is observed, as predicted. One proxy for the importance of the franchisor's input that has been used in the literature but is not included in table 5 is the chain's number of years of franchising (or business experience). The idea is that more years in franchising (or business) lead to a better known, and thus more valuable, tradename. However, this variable is also a proxy for the extent to which franchisors have access to capital as well as for learning and reputation effects. Furthermore, the empirical results that pertain to this variable are mixed. Using panel data at the franchisor level, Lafontaine and Shaw [1998] find that, after the first few years in franchising, the proportion of corporate units within chains levels off and remains stable. They conclude that a firm's years in franchising is not a major determinant of the extent of vertical integration in franchised chains. 31
IIIg: Product Substitutability
The standard incentive-cum-insurance model of retail contracting does not usually consider the competitive environment in which the principal/agent relationship operates. Instead, this relationship is modeled as if the market were perfectly competitive and price were exogenous to the firm. Alternatively, the franchisor is modeled as a monopolist, an assumption that also eliminates the importance of rivals. Most markets in which franchising is prevalent, however, are better characterized as monopolistically competitive. Usually, there are several firms that produce similar but not identical products, and firms and units within firms face downward-sloping demand. In the next three subsections, we consider the consequences of endogenous prices.
In some franchising industries, products are easily distinguishable from one another. For example, most customers have definite preferences between McDonald's hamburgers and KCF's chicken. There are, however, other industries in which the services that the agents provide are perhaps the only things that distinguish the output of one firm from that of another. Real-estate franchises, for example, fall in the latter group. Given that, across industries, there are varying degrees of differentiation among products that are provided within the industry, one can ask how these differences affect contract choice.
In order to investigate the effect of product substitutability, we amend the effort/sales relationship to include own price, p, and rival price, p , where the rival is an outlet from another chain in the same industry,
All other model assumptions are as before. Equation (16) is a standard linear demand equation, with a parameter, δ, which we assume to be positive, that represents the degree of product substitutability.
31
For a review of the empirical literature on the "ownership redirection hypothesis", according to which franchising is just a transitory phase for firms that face capital constraints, see Dant, Kaufmann and Paswan [1992] . For recent contributions, see also Lafontaine and Kaufmann [1994] , Thompson [1994] and Scott [1995] . This modification does not change the agent's incentive constraint, which is a = α. The principal, however, now chooses both price, p, and the share parameter, α, given rival choices, p and ᾱ . 32 When the two first-order conditions for this maximization are solved, having used the incentive constraint to eliminate a, one finds that, in a symmetric equilibrium,
and that dα*/dδ > 0. In other words, as products become closer substitutes, the power of the agents' incentives should be increased. This is true because it becomes more important to induce the agent to promote the product so that sales will not be eroded by customers switching to rival brands. Indeed, one can interpret the substitution effect as yet another measure of the importance of the agent's effort. The higher the degree of substitutability, the harder is the agent's task of preventing the erosion of its sales. As in subsection IIIc, therefore, the principal has an additional motive for emphasizing high-powered incentives relative to other objectives.
Note that in modeling competition, we have implicitly assumed that the random variables that are associated with own and rival demand are uncorrelated. If, however, these variables are correlated, and if the agent has private information about his own demand realization, the tendency towards integration is strengthened when competition increases. 33 Indeed, demand correlation is information that the principal can use to reduce the agent's informational rent and thus the need to integrate (Gal-Or [1995] ).
Given that most agency-theoretic models neglect the demand side of the market, it is not surprising that most empirical studies rely solely on attributes of the upstream firm and its outlets and ignore the firm's competitors. To our knowledge, Slade [1998a] is the only study that looks at contract choice as a function of the demand characteristics that agents face. In that paper, outletlevel own and cross-price elasticities of demand are related to the contracts under which these outlets operate. As the model predicts, she finds that higher cross-price elasticities are associated with higher-powered incentives for the agent. 34
32
For our purposes, it is simpler here to assume that the franchisor chooses price. Below we relax this assumption.
33
Here the increase in the cross-price elasticity is due to an increase in the number of competitors.
34
When our evidence is from very few studies, we do not construct a table.
IIIh: Spillovers Within the Chain
One reason for the prevalence of franchise chains rather than single outlets is that there are externalities that are associated with the brand or chain name. Although spillovers can be beneficial, they can also create problems for both franchisees and franchisors. For example, one form that a spillover can take is a demand externality. With this sort of spillover, a low price at one outlet in a chain increases demand, not only at that outlet but also for other franchisees in the same chain.
Conversely, a high price can cause customers to switch their business to another chain rather than merely seek a different unit of the same chain.
The situation just described is the converse of the product-substitutability case. Specifically, one can rewrite the demand equation as
There are two differences between equations (16) and (18). First, p in (18) is the price charged by a franchisee in the same chain, not in a rival chain as in (16). As a consequence, the principal chooses p, p , α, and ᾱ . 35 Second, a high price at a given unit causes an erosion of the sales of all members of the chain (i.e., µ > 0).
With these modifications, the corresponding equation for the optimal contract is
and dα*/dµ < 0. In other words, when there are demand externalities of the type one normally associates with branding, integration becomes more desirable. The reason is that the chain internalizes the spillover that is external to the individual unit.
There are other sorts of spillovers, such as franchisee free riding. Indeed, once an agent is given high-powered incentives via a franchise contract, the franchisee can shirk and free ride on the tradename (see e.g. Klein, [1980] and Brickley and Dark, [1987] ). The problem is that the cost of the agent's effort to maintain the quality of the trademark is private, whereas the benefits of his activities accrue, at least partially, to all members of the chain. In this case, the spillover works through effort, not price.
Whether the externality works through price or effort, the free-riding problem is exacerbated in situations where consumers do not impose sufficient discipline on retailers, namely in cases of non-repeat businesses. The franchisor, unlike the franchisee, can internalize spillovers 35 The situation is exacerbated when the franchisee chooses price. This situation can be modeled by changing the sign of δ in the demand equation in subsection IIIi. that damage the trademark by operating units in transient-customer locations, such as freeway exits, herself. Table 6 summarizes the evidence from studies that have examined the effect of non-repeat business on the propensity to franchise. This table shows that the evidence on free riding is mixed.
One explanation for the lack of strong evidence that the free-riding problem is overcome by vertical integration is that franchisors find ways to control franchisee behavior by, for example, using approved-supplier requirements or self-enforcing contracts. If so, this implies that the role of the franchisor in maintaining service quality and trademark reputation should be particularly important in sectors where most business is transient, which in turn brings us back to the issue of franchisor incentives in a double-sided moral-hazard model of franchise contracting. In fact, measures of the "value of the tradename" have been used in the literature to test both the notion that franchisors must be given more incentives to perform when the tradename is very valuable (see We have assumed thus far that, when prices are endogenous, the principal chooses the retail price herself. In reality, however, with franchising, whether traditional or business-format, the principal usually delegates the pricing decision to the agent. 36 We now examine the principal's incentive to delegate in a strategic setting.
When price is exogenous, it is possible to normalize and make no distinction between rewarding the agent on the basis of revenues or sales. With endogenous prices, in contrast, particularly when the agent chooses price, it is important to be more specific. We therefore adopt an alternative notation that conforms more closely with actual compensation schemes in franchise chains. We maintain the demand assumption of subsection IIIg (i.e., q = 1 -p + δp + a + ε), and assume that the business-format franchisee pays the principal a royalty, ρ, per unit sold as well as a fixed franchise fee, F. 37 The retail surplus is then
The agent chooses effort, a, and price, p, to maximize this surplus, given rival choices, p and ā , where the rival is a franchisee from another chain in the same industry.
The two first-order conditions for the maximization of (20) can be solved to yield the retail reaction functions,
which are clearly upward sloping. Furthermore, in a symmetric equilibrium, the retail price is 36 US Antitrust laws prevent franchisors from setting prices in franchised units as these are independent businesses under the law. A recent Supreme Court decision (State Oil v. Khan) however has transformed the per se status of maximum resale price maintenance to a rule of reason status, which opens the possibility that franchisors may start controlling franchisee prices more in the U.S. in the future.
37
With traditional franchising, ρ can be interpreted as the wholesale price that the retailer pays to the manufacturer for the product, and F as the fixed rent that he pays for the use of the retail outlet, which we assume is owned by the upstream firm. If there were no rent, dealings between principal and agent would be arms length, and the principal would maximize the wholesale, not the total, surplus.
where D stands for delegation. Comparative statics, with ρ exogenous to the retailer, yield dp/dr < 0, dp/dσ 2 < 0, dp/dδ > 0, and dp/dρ > 0. Finally, if the retailer is risk neutral or there is no risk, the equilibrium retail price is 38
We compare the delegated situation to the integrated, in which the retailer is a salaried employee. In this case, the manufacturer chooses the retail price, p, given rival price, p , which is chosen by the rival manufacturer. In a symmetric equilibrium of the integrated game, the retail price
where I stands for integrated. Clearly, under retailer risk neutrality, principals prefer the delegated situation. Indeed, since reaction functions slope up, when a principal increases the royalty rate to her franchisee, not only does her retailer raise price but also the rival retailer responds with a price increase. In equilibrium, prices and profits are higher as a consequence. 39 Under agent risk neutrality then, delegation is a dominant strategy. However, as rσ 2 increases, the advantages of delegation fall. This occurs because the higher retail price is accompanied by an increase in the proportion of the franchisee's income that is variable, thereby increasing the risk that the retailer must bear. At some level of risk and/or risk aversion, the retailer's need for compensation for bearing increased risk makes vertical separation unattractive, and the firm chooses to vertically integrate instead. On the other hand, the more substitutable the products (the higher is δ), the more the firms benefit from delegation (franchising), and thus the more likely it will be chosen. Overall then, our model predicts that vertical separation will be preferred when products are highly substitutable and there is little risk or risk aversion.
One can test these hypotheses individually but to our knowledge this has not been done.
Alternatively, a joint test can be constructed from the observation that delegation is more apt to occur when reaction functions are steep, since the slope of the reaction functions is δ/(1 + rσ 2 ). As
38
Most of the theoretical papers on this subject assume that there is no uncertainty and thus no moral hazard (e.g., Vickers [1985] , Bonanno and Vickers [1988] , and Rey and Stiglitz 1995] ).
39
In the terminology of Fudenberg and Tirole [1984] , this is a fat-cat game.
with the product-substitutability model, however, these tests require information about each unit's competitors. Slade [1998a] , who has such data, finds that delegation is more likely when rivalreaction functions are steep, as predicted. 40 It is interesting to note that once again we come face to face with the prediction that franchising should be discouraged by local-market risk. As we have already discussed, however, the data are inconsistent with this prediction.
IIIj: Multiple Tasks
In many retailing situations the agent performs more than one task. For example, a servicestation operator might repair cars as well as sell gasoline, a publican might offer food services as well as beer, and a real-estate agent might rent houses as well as sell properties. Generally, when this is the case, the optimal contract for one task depends on the characteristics of the others Milgrom 1991 and .
There are many possible variants of multi-task models. We develop a very simple version that illustrates our point. Suppose that there are n tasks and that the agent exerts effort, a i , on the ith task. Effort results in output according to the linear relationship
where q, a, and ε are vectors of outputs, efforts, and shocks, respectively, and Σ is the variance/covariance matrix of ε. The agent's cost of effort is given by (a T a)/2, and the risk premium is -(r/2) α T Σα. First-order conditions for the maximization of the agent's certainty-equivalent income with respect to the vector of effort levels yield a i = α i , i = 1,...,n. The principal chooses the vector of commissions, α, to maximize the total surplus, which after substitution of the incentive constraint is
where j is a vector of ones. First-order conditions for this maximization can be manipulated to yield
In the special case where n = 2 and σ 11 = σ 22 = σ 2 , equation (27) In her model, however, there is no risk and therefore no agency cost.
If one compares equations (6) and (28) it is clear that, when a second task is added, the power of the agent's incentives in the optimal contract falls (rises) if the associated risks are positively (negatively) correlated. This occurs for pure insurance reasons. In other words, positive correlation means higher risk, whereas negative correlation is a source of risk diversification for the agent.
In this simple model, tasks are linked only through covariation in uncertainty. There are, however, many other possible linkages. For example, the level of effort devoted to one task can affect the marginal cost of performing the other, and, when prices are endogenous, nonzero crossprice elasticities of demand for the outputs can link the returns to effort. Slade [1996] develops a model that incorporates these three effects and shows that, if an agent has full residual-claimancy rights on outcomes for a second task, the power of incentives for a first task (here gasoline sales) should be lower when the tasks are more complementary. Her empirical application of the model to retail gasoline supports the model's prediction. Specifically, she finds that when the second activity is repairing cars, which is less complementary with selling gasoline than managing a convenience store, agent gasoline-sales incentives are higher powered.
IIIk: Franchise Contract Terms
As noted in the introduction, much of the empirical literature on retail contracting has focused on the dichotomous choice between integration and separation rather than on the terms of the franchise contract. Some authors, however, have examined factors that affect the share parameter, α, empirically. 41 Three principal conclusions arise from this set of studies. First, the effects of factors such as risk, the importance of the agent's or the principal's inputs, outlet size, and monitoring difficulty are consistent with those that we have discussed. In other words, factors that tend to increase the degree of separation also tend to increase the agent's share of residual claims.
Second, these factors explain a much larger proportion of the variation in the extent of vertical integration than of the variation in share parameters. 42 Thus it appears that firms, in responding to risk, incentive, and monitoring-cost issues, adjust by changing how much they use franchising rather than by altering the terms of their franchise contracts. In that sense, the theoretical models seem to be missing some important aspects of the upstream/downstream relationship. Third, and finally, franchise fees are in general not negatively correlated with royalty rates, despite the fact that 41 For example, Lafontaine [1992a] , Sen [1993] , Rao and Srinivasan [1995] , Garen and Wimmer [1996] and Gagné et al. [1997] 42 See Lafontaine [1992a] specifically on this.
the standard principal-agent model suggests that they should be. 43 Instead, fixed fees tend to be set at levels that compensate the franchisor for expenses incurred in setting up a franchised unit. 44 Other contributions to this literature provide some additional insights. In particular, Lafontaine and Shaw [1996] show that not only are contract terms the same for all franchisees that join a chain at a point in time, as established in the earlier literature, but also they are quite persistent over time. In fact, they find that contract terms are changed very infrequently, that they do not follow any obvious pattern up or down when they are adjusted, and that they do not vary in an obvious way as firms age or grow. Moreover, in their data, fixed effects account for about 85% of the variation in royalty rates and franchise fees and a very small proportion of this firm-level heterogeneity is related to sectoral differences. They conclude that royalty rates are principally determined by differences across firms, differences that likely arise from unobserved heterogeneity in production and monitoring technologies, as well as by quality differences. The authors also note that differences in contract terms can reflect complementarities or substitution possibilities between royalty rates and franchise fees as well as other choices that firms make in their contracts, choices that are, unfortunately, not observed.
Finally, several studies examine the use of various franchise-contract terms other than royalty rates and franchise fees. 45 For example, Dnes [1993] focuses on franchisor control of leases, and on non-compete covenants, tie-in clauses, and clauses governing the transfer of franchisee assets upon termination. He argues that these clauses act together to protect each party from the potentially opportunistic behavior of the other. Brickley [1997] finds evidence that franchisors impose restrictions on passive ownership, rely on area-development plans, and require mandatory advertising contributions more often when the potential for franchisee free riding is high. He also finds that these contract clauses are complementary. Finally, Mathewson and Winter [1994] show that certain contract clauses, especially exclusive territories and various forms of quantity forcing, occur together in franchise contracts. 46 43 This prediction results from the fact that, in most theoretical models, the principal is assumed to extract all rent from the agent, an assumption that we have not exploited.
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See Lafontaine [1992a] and Dnes [1993] on this issue.
45
In addition to those specifically mentioned, see Bercovitz [1998a] . 46 See Athey and Stern [1997] for theoretical arguments as to why one might expect such complementarities.
IV: Further Comments
Having completed our survey of the factors that determine contract choice and contract terms in franchise markets, we are left with a number of loose ends. In this section, we address some of the issues that we believe are important but make no attempt to integrate them into the framework of section III. In particular, we first discuss one of the most important consequences of franchising --its effect on the level of retail prices. We then consider the effect of franchising on firm performance, the reasons why franchisors choose to employ a standard set of contracts rather than fine tune each contract to the characteristics of the agent and the market, and the reasons why royalties are typically calculated as a percentage of sales rather than profits. Finally, we confront the notion of asset specificity that we touched upon briefly in the introduction.
IVa: Prices at Delegated Outlets
In addition to considering when firms might want to use delegation or integration, empirical research on retail contracting has also been concerned with some consequences of this decision.
One area that has received relatively more attention is the effect of contractual form on the final prices that consumers pay.
There are several reasons why prices might be higher at separated outlets. First, some transactions are more costly in a market than inside a firm. For example, contracts written with franchisees are often more complex and thus costlier to write and enforce than those written with employees. Second, because separation involves two firms rather than one, it can introduce an additional administrative layer. Third, when retailers have market power, double-marginalization (i.e., successive output restrictions) can arise. Fourth, the existence of spillovers such as those described in section IIIh can lead franchisees to choose prices above those that maximize the chain's profits. Finally, in a strategic model of contracting, separation lowers retailers' perceived elasticities of demand and thus increases retail markups (see Rey and Stiglitz, [1995] ). Table 7 summarizes results from six studies that are relevant to this issue. Three deal with retail prices of gasoline in the U.S., another deals with prices charged by retailers of separated and integrated soft-drink bottlers, still another involves beer sold in public houses in the U.K., and the last two are concerned with fast-food franchising in certain U.S. submarkets. Barron and Umbeck [1984] and Slade [1998b] look at legally mandated changes in contractual arrangements (i.e., before and after studies). Muris, Scheffman, and Spiller [1992] also do a before-and-after study in that they focus on the temporal effect on retail prices of soft-drink manufacturers' decisions to buy back some of their bottlers. The other studies look at the effect of contract type on prices in a cross section of contracts. All seven studies find that, as predicted by theory, increases in the degree of vertical separation, whether voluntary or mandated, result in higher retail prices. 
IVb: Franchising and Firm Performance
Another area that has received attention in the literature is the effect of franchising, or of franchise-contract terms, on firm performance, where firm performance can refer to profitability, service quality, or survival. Shelton's [1967] analysis is a classic in this respect. He uses data on costs, revenues, and profits for outlets in a single chain to examine the effect of switching from franchising to company ownership and from company ownership back to franchising and finds no tendency for revenues to differ according to regime. However, he finds that, under company ownership, costs are higher and thus profits are lower. The major advantage of his study is that its design holds most things constant as the mode of organization changes. Its main drawback is that units were operated under company ownership only when there was no franchisee available or during a transition period. In other words, franchising was the preferred mode, and company ownership was a transitory phase.
Shelton's findings suggests that franchising was indeed more efficient for all units of the firm that he studied. Consequently one might expect company-owned units to under perform in other settings. In a context where firms prefer to own and operate some of their units, Krueger [1991] finds that company employees are paid slightly more and face somewhat steeper earnings profiles than employees in franchised units, which is evidence of higher labor costs in units that are operated by the chain. He argues that the lower powered incentives given to managers of company restaurants make it necessary to offer greater incentives to employees, which take the form of efficiency wages and steeper earnings profiles. Barron and Umbeck [1984] examine the effect of divorcement, or "forced franchising," of gasoline stations not only on prices, as noted above, but also on hours of operation. They find that franchising leads to a reduction in hours. In addition, Beheler (1991) assesses the effect of company ownership on the health-inspection scores of a sample of 100 fast-food restaurants from 14 chains operating in the St. Louis metropolitan area. He finds that these scores are poorer for company-owned units.
Turning to contract terms, Agrawal and Lal [1995] assess how royalty rates affect the level of services provided by franchisees and find that higher rates lead to lower franchisee services. At the same time, and consistent with a double-sided moral hazard model of franchising, they find that higher royalties lead to greater brand-name investment by franchisors. Finally, Lafontaine and Shaw [1998] examine the effect of initial contract terms on franchisor survival five years later and find a positive relationship with both royalty rates and franchise fees. Only the latter, however is significant. 47 To summarize, the evidence concerning the effect of company ownership on franchisee performance is mixed. Higher royalty rates and franchise fees, however, tend to lower (raise) franchisee (franchisor) performance.
IVc: Within-Firm Contract Uniformity Though our model in Section III did not highlight this, most theoretical contracting models imply that the principal should tailor the terms of the contract to suit the characteristics of the agent, the outlet, and the market. In other words, equation (1) is the output/effort relationship for a particular franchisee and franchisor and for a particular local market. It is clear then that the optimal share parameter, α * , should differ by outlet within a chain as well as across chains. Contracts that are observed in practice, in contrast, are remarkably insensitive to variations in individual, outlet, and market conditions. Indeed, many firms use a standard business-format-franchising contract --a single royalty-rate and franchise-fee combination --for all of their franchised operations that join the chain at a point in time. The same lack of variation is observed in traditional franchising, where a manufacturer often charges the same wholesale price to all of her leased operations. 48 When this 47 See also Shane [1997] on the effect of franchise-contract terms on instantaneous survival. For assessments of franchisor survival rates, see Price [1996] , Shane [1996] and Stanworth [1996] . For the effect of franchising on small-business survival, see Williams (1998) , Bates [1998] , and the references therein. 48 In the U.S., the Robinson-Patman Act requires wholesale-price uniformity, at least locally. This is not true, however, in Canada. Nevertheless, price uniformity across buyers is common there as well (e.g., in gasoline is true, the only choice that the principal makes in the end is whether to franchise or to self operate.
In other words, when the characteristics of individual units differ, the upstream firm chooses to operate those units with characteristics that require less high-powered incentives, and to franchise those that require more, which explains the focus in empirical work on the choice between integration and separation rather than on the terms of the contract.
Models that emphasize incentive issues for both parties --double-sided moral-hazard models --provide one possible explanation for this lack of contract fine tuning. These models recognize that, with most franchising arrangements, not only does the agent have to provide effort, but also the principal must maintain the value of the trademark or company logo. With moral hazard on the part of both parties, even when both are risk neutral, an optimal contract involves revenue sharing. 49 In a double-sided moral-hazard context, Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine [1995] show that, under specific assumptions concerning functional forms, the benefits of customizing contracts can be quite limited, if not zero. This implies that the optimal contract is insensitive to many relationship-specific circumstances. In addition, their model might at least partially explain the persistence of uniform contract terms over time found by Lafontaine and Shaw [1996] . Indeed, in the Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine model, the terms of the optimal contract remain unchanged as the franchise chain grows. 50 Other reasons that have been advanced in the literature to explain the lack of customization involve the high costs of customizing, either the direct cost of designing and administering many different contracts (Holmström and Milgrom [1987] and Lafontaine [1992b] ) or the high potential for franchisor opportunism that arises when contracts can vary (McAfee and Schwartz [1994] ).
IVd: Why Royalties on Sales?
With most variants of the model of section III, price is normalized to one and there are no input costs other than agent effort. As a result, there is no operational difference between royalties on sales, input markups, and royalties on profits. Indeed, most models of retail contracting make no markets; see Slade [1996 and on this). Also, the Robinson-Patman act does not explain contract uniformity in business-format franchising, as the Act applies to the sale of commodities, which do not include franchising rights. See McAfee and Schwartz [1994] and Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine [1995] for further arguments against legal constraints as the main source of contract uniformity in business-format franchising.
49
See e.g. Rubin [1978] , Lal [1990] , and Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine [1995] . Carmichael [1983] has shown that with two agents or more and moral hazard on the principal's side as well as the agents', the first best can be achieved with a contract based on relative outputs. However, we do not observe this type of contract in franchising. Why this is the case is beyond the scope of the present paper.
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More specifically, Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine [1995] show that, when the production function is CobbDouglas and the cost-of-effort function is exponential, the optimal-share parameter is independent of the scale of operation, and, as a result, of the level of demand and the degree of competition in the market. The share parameter is also independent of both parties' cost-of-effort parameters. distinction among these possibilities. In reality, however, business-format contracts usually involve royalties on sales. 51 The puzzling issue is why business-format-franchise contracts systematically emphasize "sales sharing" rather than profit sharing. For example, Lafontaine [1992b] conducted a survey and found that, of the 127 franchisors who responded to this question, 123 charged some form of royalties. Of these, 112 asked for a percentage of sales or revenues. Only two franchisors requested a proportion of profits, while another four were paid a proportion of gross margins. 52 The traditional explanation for the use of sales rather than profit-based royalties is that the latter are too difficult to measure. For example, franchisees can pad their costs by including personal cars and salaries for family members, and cost padding can be difficult to observe and to contract upon. However, this measurement argument does not explain why franchisors do not collect a proportion of gross margins. Rubin [1978] proposes a more substantive explanation for sales sharing: he argues that franchisee effort controls costs as well as stimulating demand. Franchisor effort, in contrast, only affects demand. Consequently, franchisees should be given full residual claimancy on cost reductions, whereas franchisors should be paid some proportion of sales so that they have incentives to maintain the value of the tradename. Maness [1996] formalizes this argument by assuming that costs are noncontractible, and as such must be borne by the owner of the outlet.
Thus the decision to franchise (to have the franchisee own the outlet) or operate directly (to have the company own the unit) hinges on which party is better at controlling unit costs. Furthermore, the sharing rule must allow the owner of the unit to cover the costs of operation and thus satisfy his or her individual-rationality constraint. Therefore, in contrast to say sharecropping, where the 50/50 rule for output often applies, royalty rates in franchise agreements are low, typically between 5 and 10%.
IVe: Asset Specificity
Asset specificity is an important area of the theoretical literature that we have, up to now, had little to say about. We made this choice because we believe that it is far less important for retail contracting than for the purchase and sale of intermediate inputs. As a result, we don't think it sheds much new light on the empirical regularities highlighted herein. Nevertheless, as this issue regularly surfaces in the literature, we discuss how we arrived at this conclusion.
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In traditional franchise agreements, the franchisor sells a manufactured product to the franchisee who then resells it. Assuming that the franchisee has little leeway on prices, input markups are equivalent to royalties on sales. See Dnes [1993] and Lafontaine [1993] and the references therein for more on this and on tying in businessformat franchising.
The positive effect of unit size on company ownership has been interpreted by some (e.g. Brickley and Dark [1987] and Scott [1995] ) as evidence that franchisors find it more costly to rely on franchising when franchisees are required to make large relationship-specific investments. We, however, find no evidence that total investment relates positively to asset specificity in retail contracting. For example, the largest gasoline stations are high-volume self-service stations that are the least specialized. The owner of such a station, if terminated by one refiner, could easily obtain a contract with another. The value of his assets should therefore not be significantly lower outside of the relationship. The same is true in business-format franchising. Within this group, the hotel industry requires the largest absolute level of investment. This investment, however, is again not specific; hotel banners are routinely changed with little effect on property values. Our point is that overall investment is not a good measure of asset specificity. 53 Klein [1995] notes that, from an incentive perspective, what matters is not the level of specific investment by franchisees, as these are sunk and should not affect behavior, but rather the rents or quasi rents that the franchisee can expect to lose if he is terminated. 54 Moreover, Dnes [1993] finds that franchisees' specific investments are protected by the terms of franchise agreements. More specifically, he argues that the contractual clauses that govern the transfer of franchisee assets upon termination are set such that "if the franchisor withdraws from a contract and offers to buy assets (even if this follows the franchisee offering assets for sale), then the prices are governed by something other than just the franchisor's wishes," be it arbitration or some notion of fair-market value. (p. 390) 55 Presumably, units of franchisees who are terminated for disciplinary reasons are viable, and franchisors will want to buy them or to allow other franchisees to do so. Consequently, upon termination, the current franchisee does not forego the rents that are attached to specific assets, and in that sense, these rents cannot play a self-enforcement role. On the other hand, other rents are lost by franchisees upon termination. In particular, the non-compete clauses that are found in most franchise contracts make it difficult for franchisees to put the human capital they have accumulated within the chain to good use upon termination. Similarly, given that franchisees are often allowed to expand their business by owning additional outlets in a chain, whatever rents are associated with the right to purchase these extra units are foregone upon 53 See Dnes [1993] and Wimmer and Garen [1996] for attempts to capture the part of total investment that is specific.
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While specific assets can generate rents, they are not necessary; downstream rents can also arise because franchisors choose to leave them with franchisees (see Kaufmann and Lafontaine [1994] and Michael and Moore [1995] for evidence that some franchisors choose to do this). 55 Dnes argues that franchisees sustain a loss if they fail and their franchisor decides not to buy back their unit because it is not viable, and that this loss is larger the more specific assets are involved. He argues that such potential losses give franchisees incentives to get involved only if they truly are able to perform as they say they are. Thus he concludes that specific investments can serve a franchisee-screening function.
termination from a franchised system. 56 However, the value of such rents is not well captured by measures of specific investments.
V: Final Remarks
A surprising finding of our survey of retail contracting under exclusive marks is the robust nature of the evidence. Indeed, in almost every case where a factor is statistically significant, its effect on the power of agent incentives in real-world contracts is the same across studies. In other words, in spite of the fact that researchers assess different industries over different time periods using a number of proxies for a given factor, their empirical findings are usually consistent with one another.
Unfortunately, the theories are much more fragile. For example, in order to obtain a tractable model, it is important to use simple specifications for agent utility and risk preference.
Furthermore, the way in which the unobservable risk factors interact with the tangible variables is also crucial, as we have demonstrated in our discussion of outlet size. Nevertheless, we hope that our attempt to organize the evidence in a unified framework will be helpful to theorists in that it
gives them a set of stylized facts to explain.
One theoretical prediction, however, is not very fragile; it surfaces over and over again. We refer to the effect of risk on agent incentives. Whether one considers the simplest incentive/insurance model or imbeds this model in one with endogenous prices and strategic delegation or one with multiple tasks and linked efforts, the theory predicts that more risky units should tend to be operated by the parent company. The evidence, however, strongly rejects this predicted tendency. We have suggested one possible explanation for the discrepancy between theory and evidence --endogenous output variability in a situation where agents have private information about local-market conditions. However, a similar finding surfaces in the sharecropping literature (see Allen and Lueck [1995] for a survey), an area where exogenous output fluctuations are apt to dominate endogenous fluctuations. Given the central role that agent risk plays in the incentive-contracting literature, and given the strength of the empirical evidence, we believe that this puzzle deserves further research.
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See for example Kaufmann and Dant [1996] and Kalnins and Lafontaine [1998] on multi-unit ownership in franchised chains. Also see Bradach (1997) on the importance of additional units for franchisee growth and statements that refusing to grant extra units to franchisees serves a disciplinary role.
